Paniek in de Polder. Polytiek in tijden van populisme

Paniek in de Polder. Polytiek in tijden van populisme

Jos de Mul. Paniek in de Polder. Polytiek in tijden van populisme. Rotterdam: Lemniscaat, februari 2017. Uitgebreide en geactualiseerde editie met twee extra hoofdstukken en…

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Kunstmatig van nature. Onderweg naar Homo sapiens 3.0

Kunstmatig van nature. Onderweg naar Homo sapiens 3.0

Jos de Mul, Kunstmatig van nature. Onderweg naar Homo sapiens 3.0. Essay Maand van de Filosofie. Rotterdam: Lemiscaat, 2014.1ste druk: 2014; 2de druk: 2016.  In…

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Destiny Domesticated. The Rebirth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Technology

Destiny Domesticated. The Rebirth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Technology

Jos de Mul. Destiny Domesticated. The Rebirth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Technology. State University of New York (SUNY) Press, 2014.  Destiny Domesticated investigates…

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Wittgenstein 2.0: Philosophical reading and writing after the mediatic turn

Wittgenstein 2.0: Philosophical reading and writing after the mediatic turn

Jos de Mul. Wittgenstein 2.0: Philosophical reading and writing after the mediatic turn. In: A. Pichler & H. Hrachovec (eds.) Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Information. Proceedings…

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The sovereign debt crisis or Sophie’s choice. On European tragedies, guilt and responsibility

The sovereign debt crisis or Sophie’s choice. On European tragedies, guilt and responsibility

Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens and Jos de Mul, The sovereign debt crisis or Sophie’s choice. On European tragedies, guilt and responsibility. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. European Union. December…

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Horizons of Hermeneutics

Horizons of Hermeneutics

Jos de Mul. Horizons of Hermeneutics: Intercultural Hermeneutics in a Globalizing World.  Frontiers of Philosophy in China. Vol. 6, No. 4 (2011), 628-655. DOI: 10.1007/s11466-011-0159-x (DOI) 10.1007/s11466-011-0159-x…

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《主权债务危机还是苏菲的抉择:论欧洲的悲剧、罪恶与责任》

《主权债务危机还是苏菲的抉择:论欧洲的悲剧、罪恶与责任》

约斯·德·穆尔 (Jos de Mul),里斯贝思·努尔德格拉芙 (Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens):《主权债务危机还是苏菲的抉择:论欧洲的悲剧、罪恶与责任》(The sovereign debt crisis or Sophie’s choice. On European tragedies, guilt and responsibility),《社会科学战线》2012年第4期(Social Science Front no.4 2012),《新华文摘》2012年第13期全文转载(Xinhua Digest ,no13 2012).

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The Work of Art in the Age of Digital Recombination

The Work of Art in the Age of Digital Recombination

Jos de Mul. The work of art in the age of digital recombination. In J. Raessens, M. Schäfer, M. v. d. Boomen, Lehmann and S. A.-S.…

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PedoBot® is niet boos, maar wel verdrietig (en soms opgewonden)

PedoBot® is niet boos, maar wel verdrietig (en soms opgewonden)

Jos de Mul. PedoBot® is niet boos, maar wel verdrietig (en soms opgewonden). Over intelligente robots, emoties en sociale interactie. In J.B. de Jong (red.),…

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The game of life. Narrative and ludic identity formation in computer games

The game of life. Narrative and ludic identity formation in computer games

Jos de Mul. The game of life. Narrative and ludic identity formation in computer games. In: J. Goldstein and J. Raessens,Handbook of Computer Games Studies. Cambridge MA…

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Possible printings.  On 3D printing, database ontology and open (meta)design

Possible printings. On 3D printing, database ontology and open (meta)design

Jos de Mul. Possible printings. On 3D printing, database ontology and open (meta)design. In: B. van den Berg, S. van der Hof & E. Kosta…

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Possible printings.  On 3D printing, database ontology and open (meta)design

Possible printings. On 3D printing, database ontology and open (meta)design

Jos de Mul. Possible printings. On 3D printing, database ontology and open (meta)design. In: B. van den Berg, S. van der Hof & E. Kosta…

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Boeken: beschrijving en recensies

Frank Maet. Nieuwe artistieke tijden. Een filosofische kritiek van een door technologie bepaalde kunst

Frank Maet. Nieuwe artistieke tijden. Een filosofische kritiek van een door technologie bepaalde kunst. Proefschrift Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. Promotores: Prof.dr. J. de Mul en Prof.dr. P. de Graeve (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven). Promotiedatum: 17 november, 2011.

Leescommissie:
Prof.dr. G. Groot (Faculteit Wijsbegeerte. Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam / Faculteit Letteren, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)
Prof.dr. A. van den Braembussche (Faculteit Letteren en Filosofie, Vrije Universiteit Brussel)
Prof.dr. Th. de Duve (Département d'arts plastiques, Université Lille 3).

 

English Summary:
New artistic times. A philosophical critique of the relation between art and technology
My research concerns the contemporary relation between art and technology, and focuses on the critical potential of their interaction. In each chapter another dimension of the relationship is thought through: the present-day situation of the art world (chapter 1); the history of art of the 20th and 21st century (chapter 2); the metaphysical dimension of art and technology (chapter 3); the (post)kantian philosophy of art (chapter 4); postkantian art criticism (chapter 5). In the 6th and last chapter all analyses are brought together in relation to a recent work of art: the movie Zidane, a 21st Century Portrait by Douglas Gordon and Philippe Parreno. In this last chapter I also present a new image of art: “the art of transitivity”.

Michiel de Lange. Moving Circles: Mobile Technologies and Playful Identities

Michiel de Lange, Moving Circles: Mobile Technologies and Playful Identities [Bewegende circels. Mobiele technologieen en speelse identiteiten]. Promotieonderzoek in het kader van het door  NWO gesubsidieerde onderzoeksprogramma Playful Identities. From Narrative to Ludic Identity. Medepromotores: Prof.dr. Valerie Frissen (Faculteit Wijsbegeerte, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam) en Prof. dr. Joost Raessens (Faculteit Geesteswetenschappen, Universiteit Utrecht). Promotiedatum: 16-11-2010.

Leescommissie:
Prof.dr. J. Jansz (Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication, Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Prof.dr. J. Katz (Department of Communication, Rutgers University, USA)
Dr. S. Aupers (Centre for Rotterdam Cultural Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam)

 
 
English summary: Moving Circles: Mobile Technologies and Playful Identities
Mobile media technologies have a tremendous influence on how we communicate with each other, relate to the world, and understand ourselves. Medium specific properties and user practices challenge the idea that the narrative is the privileged mediation of identity. Moving Circles explores how the notion of play sheds new light on the ways mobile media shape identity. This occurs on four levels: we play on the mobile, with the mobile, through the mobile, and we are played by the mobile. Mobile technologies bring new freedom of movement. Yet at the same time they constrict us. In this dialectic we become moving circles.

Harry van den Bouwhuijsen. In de schaduw van God. Waarom binnen de christelijke cultuur natuurwetenschap wel en menswetenschap niet tot ontwikkeling kon komen

Dr. Harry van den Bouwhuijsen, In de schaduw van God. Waarom binnen het christendom natuurwetenschap wel en menswetenschap niet van de grond kon komen [In the Shadow of God. Why Natural Science Could and Science of Man Could Not Develop in Christian Culture]. Co-referent: Dr. F.A. Muller . Promotiedatum: 18-03-2010. Publicatie: In de schaduw van God. Waarom binnen het christendom natuurwetenschap wel en menswetenschap niet van de grond kon komen. Kampen: Klement, 2010.

Waarom kon binnen de cultuur waarin een succesrijke natuurwetenschap werd ontwikkeld, een geslaagde menswetenschap nimmer van de grond komen? In dit boek wordt de stelling verdedigd dat het de dynamiek van de christelijke cultuur is die het ontstaan van de natuurwetenschap heeft mogelijk gemaakt, terwijl zij het ontstaan van de menswetenschap heeft belemmerd. Het probleem van de menswetenschap is dat veel van haar centrale concepten worden beheerst door religieuze noties, die in de loop van de tijd hun herkenbaar religieuze gedaante hebben verloren in precies die mate waarin ze als 'feiten' over 'de' mens een plaats innamen in de achtergrondkennis van een cultuur. Deze cultuur vindt het - om redenen die eveneens een religieuze oorsprong hebben - evident dat haar vanzelfsprekendheden universele geldigheid bezitten. Het is met die aanspraak op universele geldigheid dat christelijke vanzelfsprekendheden met betrekking tot de mens niet slechts onderdeel zijn gaan uitmaken van de westerse folk psychology; zij zijn eveneens tot de basisvooronderstellingen gaan behoren van wat wij 'menswetenschap' noemen. Daardoor drukken veel van de eigenschappen die in de menswetenschappen als 'algemeen menselijk' worden gepresenteerd, slechts de folk psychology uit van een specifieke cultuur. Een wetenschap van de mens kan niet succesvol zijn zolang zij een 'feiten­armoedige' mono-culturele onderneming blijft, omdat een dergelijke onderneming een onvoldoende empirische basis levert voor het formuleren van toetsbare theorieën over de mens. Een wetenschap van de mens dient te beschikken over een verzameling beschrijvingen van het Zelf en de Ander uit verschillende cultuurtypen. Pas wanneer aan deze voorwaarde is voldaan, kunnen vruchtbare theorieën worden ontwikkeld over de mens, het wezen dat zo veel verschillende beschrijvingen toelaat.

Summary

In this doctoral thesis a hypothesis is developed, explaining why due to the dynamic of a specific type of culture (i.e. the monotheistic type of culture) a successful natural science could come into being, where­as due to the same dynamic a successful science of man could not. The thesis consists of two parts. In the theoretical Part I, ‘Shadows of a dead God’, the hypothesis is developed. In the empirical Part II, ‘Masked Ball’, the hypothesis is tested.

I. Summary of the theoretical Part I

The core propositions to be defended are:

This raises the question of what turns a cause into a cultural cause? In order to answer this question a criterion is presented, allowing us to decide whether a set of behaviour of living beings constitute a type of culture: Starting point is Tomasello’s (1999) hypothesis that culture is the ontogenetic niche making human development possible. Phy- logenetically this niche has developed in connection with the evolu­tionary selection of a capacity for social learning (i.e. learning from and through congeners). In this capacity Tomasello distinguishes two components:

This ability to ‘identify’ with congeners and ‘shared intentionality’ fa­cilitates processes of sociogenesis and of cultural learning, in which groups of congeners cooperate in bringing about, preserving and modi­fying tools, systems of symbolic communication and representation, and social forms of organisation and institutions.

Tomasello distinguishes three time-dimensions in human cognitive development:

i        phylogenetic (evolutionary) time;

ii       historical time;

iii      ontogenetic time.

The ability to learn from and through congeners selected in phyloge­netic time, requires for its realisation an ontogenetic niche which — contingent on historical circumstances — is developed in historical time, generating a specific dynamic and coherence. This process will constitute the ‘cognitive habitat’ in which the cognitive ontogenesis of the human organism takes place, and determines in which way the human organism learns to learn from congeners.

Following Balagangadhara (1994), we take the coming into being of specific cultures (or culture types) to be the way in which ontogene­tic niches are constituted, on the basis of their specific dynamic and coherence. The core variable is the way in which the human organ­ism learns to learn form its congeners.

It is our hypothesis that a culture type comes into being when a specific configuration of learning arises; that is to say that when from the repertoire of learning abilities innate in homo sapiens,one specific way of learning is particularly favoured, as a result of which this way of learning eventually will come to dominate the other ones. In a con­figuration of learning the phylogenetic repertoire of learning abilities has been configured in historical time in such a way that there is one dominant learning ability, to which the other learning abilities have sub-dominant relations. Our slogan: culture types are specific configura­tions of learning. A configuration of learning constitutes a specific cog­nitive habitat, which enables and constrains the production and repro­duction of culture-specific knowledge.

Central elements in this doctoral thesis are the explication of the cognitive habitat of a specific culture type (the monotheistic one), and the investigation of the forms of enablement and constraints it opens up for generating culture specific knowledge.

Apart from the question how many configurations of learning can be distinguished, our culture criterion raises the question how such a configuration comes into being in historical time. That depends on the configuration in question. Historical research must flesh out the theoretical bones here. For one particular type of culture, the mono­theistic one, this configuration and the process in which it came into being, can be described fairly accurately at the moment. This is what we will do in Part II, focusing on one instantiation of the monotheis­tic culture type: western Christianity.

The monotheistic type of culture came into being in a cumulative process in which a configuration of learning was effected, dominated by exegetic learning (‘exegesis’ is used here in a broad sense: interpreta­tion, reading, explanation). All other forms of learning (for example practical learning, mimesis, learning linked to social intelligence) have a sub-dominant and derived position in this configuration.

In Part I we argue that the monotheistic type of culture as a confi­guration of learning has come into being in a process which we call ‘the dynamic of monotheism’. In this argument we explain:

i        what this ‘dynamic of monotheism’ consist of (Chapter 1);

ii       in what way this dynamic generates a configuration of learning (Chapter 1);

iii      in what way this dynamic and this configuration of learning are with­in the Christian cognitive space connected to the view of man as God’s image-bearer (Chapter 2).

The dynamic of monotheism

By the term ‘monotheism’ we refer to the monotheism-of-the-Book, of which Judaism, Christianity, Islam and — as most recent member of the family Mormonism — are different instantiations.

We are after the dynamic of monotheism as such. That is to say: we take monotheism for our unit of analysis, conceiving it as a ‘sys­tem’ with dynamic features. By that we do notmean that monothe­ism is a rigorous logical system, comparable to Euclidian geometry and arithmetic. In our view monotheism gets its systematic character from two components, which are tightly intertwined:

  1. a set of interconnected (but not logically following) topoi;
    1. a specific configuration of learning and meta-learning processes (to which we refer as ‘exegetic configuration of learning’).

On the one hand these components render monotheism its dynamic; on the other hand they impose specific constraints on it.

By conceiving a set of interconnected, but not logically following topoias a constituting component of monotheism, we want to em­phasize that monotheism is an opensystem, necessarily having an inter­nal dynamic.After all, precisely because these topoido not cohere logi­cally, they ask for a ‘theo-logic’, providing its own connections and reconciling what seems contradictory. This necessity of a theo-logic gives monotheism a fundamentally open character.

Besides this internal dynamic, monotheism because of its claim to uni­versalityalso generates an expansive dynamic, consisting of two move­ments:

  • proselytizing: by making converts, monotheism spreads in specific interpretations (Chapter 3);
  • secularisation: monotheism maintains itself and spreads in a transfor­med shape, which is no longer recognizably monotheistic, namely as structure of a worldview (Chapter 4-8).

Relation between the dynamic of monotheism and the exe­getic configuration of learning

The internal dynamic of monotheism generates a continuing flow of beliefs. These beliefs are the major criteria on the basis of which the numerous Jewish, Christian en Islamic denominations define their iden­tity.

The monotheistic emphasis on beliefs ensues directly from the re­lation between God and man. God, the Creator of the universe, has

Man as image-bearer of God

In Christianity the idea of man as image-bearer of God has a promi­nent position. The core of this idea is not that man resembles God physically or mentally (God is outside the scope of those categories), but that like God man can distinguish between good and evil. Accor­ding to Christianity, the crucial difference between man and animal lies in this human ability to acquire moral knowledge, and to make moral choices on the basis of it. The moral ability is the basis of the specific human dignity, to which every human being — as bearer of this ability — is entitled. Humans can derive certain rights from this dignity. In this respect — having a moral ability, bearing human dig­nity, and having certain rights based on that — all humans are equal in the eyes of God. As moral agents, humans can personally be held ac­countable for their deeds.

In the Christian cognitive habitat man is prototypically bearer of be­liefs, beliefs being the primary criterion for distinguishing individuals from each other, as opposed to non-monotheistic cultures in which the individual and his/her beliefs are not considered very important. Decisive is here whether someone is behaving properly, according to tradition. In these non-monotheistic cultures the individual person as a moral agent is not emphatically distinguished from his/her social position, as is the case in Christianity. In non-monotheistic cultures ‘the individual person’ is not an ethical or normative category, and does not play a major part in the moral judgment of humans.

The portrayal of man in which the individual person is conceived as bearer of beliefs, raises the question where these beliefs are located. They are located ‘in’ the human mind. In this model the human mind is a reservoir of beliefs, which ‘I’ must be able to overlook from one fixed position, in order to make a well-considered choice. This fixed position is considered to be a functional unity; it remains ‘itself5 in different circumstances, and that is why it is accountable for the choices it has made. This moral anchor-point, being the seat of the human moral responsibility, is considered to be the indivisible core of the intimate, individual self. Ideally this ‘self expresses itself in the ac­tions of the individual.

The cultural causes of the failure of the science of man

Christianity teaches that man is created in God’s image, and that this applies to every single man. In Part II it is demonstrated how in the process of secularisation, which developed in the Christian world from the seventeenth century onwards, the implications of the idea of man as God’s image-bearer were turned into ‘natural’ features of man.

For those whose ontogenesis did not take place in the Christian habitat, these ‘natural’ features are not in the least self-evident. Rather they are explananda when one tries to understand ‘the West’. One might possibly reproduce what in the Christian idiom is meant by ‘morally autonomous agent’, ‘individual beliefs as source of actions’, ‘stable inner core that can be distinguished from actions’, etc. but in the resulting ‘man’ one does not recognise the bearer of experiences as these are constituted in his own, non-monotheistic cognitive habi­tat.

The science of man as it has developed until now, can not lay a claim to the predicate ‘science’ if and in so far her research-object cannot escape from the scope of the Christian topos of man as God’s image-bearer. A successful science of man should at least have at its disposal the neces­sary data. That is to say: it should have many descriptions from different cognitive habitates (so not only in monotheistic terms!), enabling us to formulate productive hypotheses about the being that can be described in so many different ways. As long as these data are not available, what we call ‘science of man’ is little more than local folk psychology with unfounded universal pretensions.

II. Summary of the empirical Part ii

The chapters 3 — 8 meander through twenty ages of history, follow­ing a more or less chronological order, but no complete history is presented here. The emphasis is on the way the West has described the differences between itself and the Other from the Age of Discov­eries onwards.

Analysis of the western tradition of describing these differences leads to the following conclusions:

  1. Initially the western descriptions of self and Other came about within an explicitly monotheistic (in casu
  2. In the course of time this framework has lost its explicitly religious shape, but it has constrained descriptions in a secularized form ever since.
  3. This Christian framework — be it in its explicit religious or in its secularized form — does not allow facing fundamental differences between cultures. It effaces them, creating ‘differences’ instead that make the Other into variationstopos Christian versus
  4. This ‘mechanism’ by which the Other is transformed into a varia­tion of Self remains constant over time: intra-western differences be­come the matrix for describing differences between the West and ‘the Rest’.
  5. Schleiermacher historicises Kant’s transcendental analysis of Reason.
  6. He broadens Kant’s analysis of Reason by adding Gejuhlsempfinden

In Chapter 3 this mechanism is studied in terms of configurations of learning. The Other, his alterity first and foremost consisting of his participating in certain traditional practices, is fitted into the terms of the exegetical configuration of learning by coining him a dissenter or unbeliever.That is to say: characteristic practices by which groups of people, in their own eyes, fundamentally distinguish themselves from other groups — practices requiring no other justification than ‘that they are tradition’ — are now conceived as expressions of certain beliefs underlying these practices. Brought within the actual secular power of Christianity, the Other is forced to justify his traditional practices in terms of ‘underlying’ beliefs,against a systematically elaborated Christian theology. This mechanism is described on the basis of the ‘debates’ that took place in the sixteenth century between Christian theologians and representatives of American-Indian communities.

In Chapter 4 we examine the reformulation of the opposition be­tween Christian and pagan into that between ‘he-who-knows’ and ‘he-who is-ignorant’. Initially ‘being ignorant’ had the strong conno­tation of ‘being ignorant of Christianity, so uncivilised’. The gradual changing of this connotation is related to the way in which, in the course of the sixteenth century, intra-Christian differences were being used to define differences between groups of people, on the basis of how these groups defined the ‘natural’ idea of the divine. Jews, Mus­lims and the adherents of the numerous Christian denominations were thus placed in one Christian framework.

Subsequently we examine whether this framework leaves any room for understanding non-western peoples. A brief case-study will show us that the constraints which were operative in the sixteenth-century demonological descriptions, remained operative in this new frame­work. The question how successful people had been in articulating the ‘natural’ idea of the divine, was now reformulated as the question how successful people had been in obtaining knowledge of the divine message by reading the Book of Nature. This assigned the science of nature the status of a ‘soteriological bridge’ (Michael Heyd), and made reading God’s message obligatory for a Christian. ‘Being igno­rant’ now meant: not being able to understand that Nature is to be read like a Book, written by a personal God. (Please note that ‘being informed’ and ‘being ignorant’ were not conceived as mutual exclu­sive categories (like Christian and pagan), but as extremes on a con­tinuum: one can be more or less informed or ignorant).

After having examined in greater detail why natural science is the product of a specific exegetical configuration of learning (that is: of a specific culture type), we investigate why the participants of this cul­ture could conceive of themselves as ‘being informed’, even when science emancipated itself from religion in the eighteenth and nine­teenth centuries, and became an activity of its own with a specific dynamic. Christian presuppositions were now conceived as facts about man and world, facts that are part and parcel of the tacit knowledge of those whose ontogenesis took place in the (secularised) Christian cognitive habitat.

The success of this movement of the external dynamic of mono­theism can, among other things, be read from narratives describing secularisation as a process in which religious answers to problems are being replaced by scientific ones. One fails to recognise here that the internal dynamic of monotheism has so constituted the Christian cognitive habitat that it not just enabled the formulation of certain answers, but that it enabled people to raise certain questions and problems in a meaningful way in the first place. (These questions and problems were now conceived as ‘self-evident’, or as arising from ‘natural hu­man curiosity’.)

In the chapters 3 and 4 the internal and external dynamic of the mo­notheistic culture type are explored. Subsequently we have focused on the dynamic of the Christian instantiation of this culture type, de­monstrating the connection between this dynamic and the origin of natural science in Chapter 4.

In the chapters 5-8 we focus on the sciences of man. We argue that the same dynamic which enabled the origin of the natural sciences, has hampered the origin of sciences of man,because from the eighteenth century onwards, Christian presuppositions were tacitly assumed to be facts about man. This has caused a blind spot, excluding consi-derable parts of the empirical world from the domain of the sciences of man.

In the chapters 5-8 we situate the origin of the sciences of man in the context of the second movement of the external dynamic of (the Christian instantiation of) monotheism, secularisation. We explore in greater detail the thesis, put forward in Chapter 2, that from their ori­gin onwards in the middle of the eighteenth century, the sciences of man have always existed in duplicate, related to the conflicting topoi of man as God’s image-bearer on the one side and man as God’s creature on the other. These conflicting views can be summarised in the slogan: man is part of nature, yet apart from it. Man as God’s creature is part of nature;he must be explained from the powers to which he is subjected. Man as God’s image-bearer sits apart from nature;he must be understood from the decisions he has taken as a moral autono­mous, individual agent. We examine the role which both conflicting topoi have played in the secularisation of Christian culture, and how two opposing types of sciences of man came into being, both unable to break through the constraints of Christian presuppositions.

As an introduction to the chapters 6-8, Chapter 5 offers an outline of the Enlightened and ‘Counter-Enlightened’ traditions in the sciences of man, as they have taken shape within the dynamic of Christianity and the dynamic of the exegetic configuration of learning linked to it.

In Chapter 6 the outlines of the Enlightenment as a secularisation movement are examined in greater detail, in order to get a clearer picture of the way in which the Other was transformed into an early manifestation of ‘man’ as the sciences of man would come to describe him. Here we look in some detail into John Locke’s psychology, which in the eighteenth century played a central role in the devel­opment of the sciences of man. The question arises which theological and ethical problems stemmed from Locke’s rejection of innate ideas in the human mind, and we explore in which way innate ideas, which Locke (in the words of Carl Becker) “had so politely dismissed by way of the hall door” were “surreptitiously brought back again through the kitchen window” by some of his eighteenth-century fol­lowers.

In this chapter it is argued that the sciences of ‘man’ were in fact describing secularised versions of man as image-bearer of God, or of man as creature of God, pace the Enlightened philosophes who nur­tured the illusion of having freed themselves from religious influ­ences. The Christian cognitive habitat did lose its recognisably Chris­tian features to exactly the same extent as in which these features were manifesting themselves again in a secularised shape, and origi­nally religious certainties had taken their place in the tacit knowledge of that habitat.

Chapter 6 is concluded with the elaboration of an example that has a certain topicality: the view that from the nature of man his having ‘inalienable rights’ can be deduced. This idea originated in the Chris­tian cognitive habitat and can only be founded within that habitat. The idea that man has inalienable natural rights, presupposes certain Christian assumptions about man being part of the tacit knowledge underlying this idea. The assertion that a just society can only be founded on the principle of ‘unalienable rights’, encounters strong opposition from people in non-monotheistic culture types. This is a fact which in our age of globalisation, in which the West can no longer enforce its definitions of man and world as the right ones, and countries like China and India are getting an ever firmer grip on the international agenda, will increasingly turn out to be a handicap for our attempts to come to workable understandings with ‘them’.

In Chapter 7 the outlines of the Counter-Enlightenment as a secu­larisation movement is examined in greater detail in order to get a clearer picture of the way in which in the Counter-Enlightenment the Enlightened image of ‘man’ was amended. Here too it becomes clear that ‘man’ as the Counter-Enlightened intellectuals conceived him, has features which on further inspection turn out to be secular­ised versions of characteristics that are ascribed to him within the scope of Christian topoi. Like in the Enlightenment, Christian topoi lost their clearly recognisable Christian features to exactly the same degree as these features manifested themselves again in a secularised shape, and in which their Christian originals had taken their place in the tacit knowledge of ‘everyone-who-knows’. And like in the Enlighten­ment, the exegetical configuration of learning appeared as the natural precondition for thinking about and studying ‘man’.

In this chapter we also examine which consequences followed from the fact that Kant had relegated God from the domain of the theoretical Reason, a domain of which he had also shown its limits. The natural sciences as Reason’s main representatives were assigned the phenomenal world as their subject of research; God was relegated a place as ‘idea of the practical Reason’. This separation of scientific and ethical knowledge had far-reaching consequences for the Chris­tian cognitive habitat, in which ethical knowledge is the prototype of all specifically human knowledge and giving-meaning. If God disap­pears as the giver of meaning ‘behind’ the phenomenal world, this world thereby loses all meaning, because in monotheism God is the only one who, ultimately, can give meaning to the world. (The world expresses his Will; in that lies its meaning.) Monotheism (and so Christianity) is characterised by a grim dichotomy (Richard Bern­stein): God gives meaning to the world, or nothing can give it mean­ing, tertium non datur. So it is not surprising that at the moment the understanding began to take root — eighty years before the appearance of Nietzsche’s ‘madman’ — that after Kant God had to give up his role as the sole giver of meaning, the concept of ‘nihilism’ turned up, and began to find expression in art and philosophy. Nihilism implies opt­ing for the second disjunct. An alternative for nihilism is a re-occupa­tion of the first disjunct by a Giver-of-meaning, be it through a re­turn to God, or by creating a secular substitute (History, the People, Art, etc.). Most Counter-Enlightened intellectuals have tried to do the latter. In that sense the Counter-Enlightenment can be characterised as “a continuation of religion by other means” (Safranski).

We focus attention on the way in which God returns in a secular shape in the first, Divine, disjunct. As an example we choose the re­turn of the transcendent Creator-God in the shape of an immanent power ‘in’ History.

Subsequently a connection is made between the image of God as a Poet and the Counter-Enlightened emphasis on the importance of the unique. The unique as God’s artistic creation can be conceived as single event, but also as an era (‘the unique character of the Renais­sance’) or as a culture (‘the unique culture of the Trobriands’). We argue that the Counter-Enlightened emphasis on the right of the unique to be recognised as such, and its equivalence to other unique entities, takes its credibility from the scope of Christian topoi. Also the ques­tion is raised which demands follow from the image of God as a Poet, and of unique phenomena as his literary creations, for the way these creations should be read. This question is explored in Chapter 8.

In Chapter 8, after having given a brief survey of the history of her­meneutics, we discuss Schleiermacher’s ‘Copernican turn in thinking about understanding’ (De Mul), in which the foundation is laid for modern hermeneutics. Schleiermacher’s ‘Copernican turn’ consists of two aspects:as an ‘instrument’ for acquiring knowledge.

Dilthey, on his turn, uses Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics of language- expressions as vantage point for formulating a general theory for un­derstanding the historical-social world, thereby turning that world into a text and the interpreter into a reader, analogous to the way in which in the seventeenth century the natural world had been turned into a Book to be ‘read’ by man. Subsequently we examine the core ques­tion why making Nature into a text could lead to a successful science, whereas making the historical-social world into a text could not.

In this context we analyse the influence of Christian topoi — and their eventually turning into ‘natural’ characteristics of man — on the core concepts and assumptions of the science of man. These ‘natural’ characteristics of man were supposed to be universal. When it comes to knowledge of the Other, this claim to universality expressed itself, among other things, in the view that his society is basically a variation on a universal theme. All societies, according to this assumption, are built from the same building-blocks (religion, ethics, law, politics, art, etc.), which answer ‘universal human needs’, and which can be de­lineated in a similar way. Knowledge of other societies thus becomes a matter of translation: we understand God to be like this, they under­stand God to be like that; our science is like this, their science is like that, etc. In many cases, however, these ‘translations’ produce phenom­ena, which do not exist in the societies they are supposed to describe. By that the Other is labelled as the carrier of characteristics he does not possess, and his society is made into an exotic variation of ‘the’ society, as Christian culture sees it.

But not only have Christian topoi hampered understanding the Other, they also have stood in the way of understanding ourselves. Our ‘self too was portrayed in accordance with the Christian view of ‘man’ and we too were ascribed features we do not possess (as, for instance, the neuro-sciences are making increasingly clear).

Subsequently we examine the implications of Nietzsche’s message ‘God is dead’ for the science of man. If we interpret the statement ‘God is dead’ as ‘the ceasing of the constraints of the Christian cogni­tive habitat’, can we now conclude from that that Nietzsche’s mes­sage has cleared the way for a science of man? In order to answer that question we first examine which elements of Christian thought about man Nietzsche’s criticism was aiming at in particular. After that, we explore whether Nietzsche’s criticising-with-the-hammer has suc­ceeded in leading the way to a science of man after God’s demise, that is to say: a science of man outside the constraints of the Christian cognitive habitat.

The Nietzsche-example emphasises what probably had become clear after reading the data presented in Part II: that within the Chris­tian cognitive habitat it is (almost?) impossible to escape from its con­

In this context we analyse the influence of Christian topoi — and their eventually turning into ‘natural’ characteristics of man — on the core concepts and assumptions of the science of man. These ‘natural’ characteristics of man were supposed to be universal. When it comes to knowledge of the Other, this claim to universality expressed itself, among other things, in the view that his society is basically a variation on a universal theme. All societies, according to this assumption, are built from the same building-blocks (religion, ethics, law, politics, art, etc.), which answer ‘universal human needs’, and which can be de­lineated in a similar way. Knowledge of other societies thus becomes a matter of translation: we understand God to be like this, they under­stand God to be like that; our science is like this, their science is like that, etc. In many cases, however, these ‘translations’ produce phenom­ena, which do not exist in the societies they are supposed to describe. By that the Other is labelled as the carrier of characteristics he does not possess, and his society is made into an exotic variation of ‘the’ society, as Christian culture sees it.

But not only have Christian topoi hampered understanding the Other, they also have stood in the way of understanding ourselves. Our ‘self too was portrayed in accordance with the Christian view of ‘man’ and we too were ascribed features we do not possess (as, for instance, the neuro-sciences are making increasingly clear).

Subsequently we examine the implications of Nietzsche’s message ‘God is dead’ for the science of man. If we interpret the statement ‘God is dead’ as ‘the ceasing of the constraints of the Christian cogni­tive habitat’, can we now conclude from that that Nietzsche’s mes­sage has cleared the way for a science of man? In order to answer that question we first examine which elements of Christian thought about man Nietzsche’s criticism was aiming at in particular. After that, we explore whether Nietzsche’s criticising-with-the-hammer has suc­ceeded in leading the way to a science of man after God’s demise, that is to say: a science of man outside the constraints of the Christian cognitive habitat.

The Nietzsche-example emphasises what probably had become clear after reading the data presented in Part II: that within the Chris­tian cognitive habitat it is (almost?) impossible to escape from its con­straints completely. Pulverising Christian topoi produces pieces of the same topoi.As long as the science of man tries to free itself from the constraints of Christianity’s external dynamic within the Christian cognitive habitat, it will remain a ‘Münchhausen-effort’. A science of man cannot take off as long as it remains a ‘fact-barren’ mono-cul­tural project, because such a project lacks the necessary empirical basis for formulating productive theories about man. For a science of man it is a conditio sine qua non to have at its disposal a set of descriptions of Self and Other from different culture types (each putting their specific constraints on those descriptions).

Only when this condition is met, the question for the research­object of the science of man — What is man that he allows for so many descriptions? — can sensibly be raised, and productive hypotheses about man can be formulated.

The topoi of man as image-bearer of God and as God’s creature, having hampered the origin of the science of man, can now take their place in the reservoir of views from different cultures, which a pro­ductive science of man should have at its disposal. Maybe eventually there will turn out to be one portrayal of man, from which all actions of all people from all times can be explained, maybe not. Maybe, or maybe not, there will eventually be different portrayals of man from different cultures, that remain constant in time for that culture. Or maybe we can only find different portrayals of man for different cul­tures and different times. In the latter case the science of man could offer an overarching theory, linking types of portrayals of man to dif­ferent cultures. But that will happen only when the fact that people in different cultures have a different view of man is considered part of the set of explananda of the science of man. The topoi of man as im- age-bearer of God and man as God’s creature also belong to this set.