Jos de Mul. Destiny Domesticated, or Five Not-So-Easy Ways to Tame Fate, in Frank van der Stok (ed.). Daan Paans: Letters of Utopia. Breda: The Eriskay Connection, 2013 (forthcoming).

Fate. Sooner or later it knocks at everyone’s door. In many different ways. It can enter our lives gradually in the guise of an incurable disease or spring on us suddenly in the guise of an unexpected oncoming car in our lane. It can befall us from the outside like a devastating tsunami, or loom up from within like an all-consuming jealousy. Fate can happen unintentionally, or be done to us – or another person – on purpose. It comes in the horrible guise of war and the intoxicating appeal of an addiction. It is painful when it happens to us, and often even more painful when it befalls someone we love. Without wanting it our frail happiness is continuously interrupted by fatal events. And even when we are lucky enough to avoid grand catastrophes in our lives, in the end we inevitably lose our loved ones and we, ourselves die. While fate inescapably befalls us we find it hard to bear that thought. It is a burden that we cannot carry, but that we also cannot shed.

Jos de Mul, eLife. From biology to technology and back again, in P. Bruno and S.Campbell (Eds.), The Science, Politics and Ontology of Life-Philosophy. London: Continuum, forthcoming.

One of the most striking developments in the history of the sciences over the past fifty years has been the gradual moving towards each other of biology and computer science and their increasing tendency to overlap. Two things may be held responsible for that. The first is the tempestuous development of molecular biology which followed the first adequate description, in 1953, of the structure of the double helix of the DNA, the carrier of hereditary information. Biologists therefore became increasingly interested in computer science, the science which focuses, among other things, on the question what information really is and how it is encoded and transferred. No less important was that it would have been impossible to sequence and decipher the human genome without the use of ever stronger computers. This resulted in a fundamental digitalization of biology. This phenomenon is particularly visible in molecular biology, where DNA-research increasingly moves from the analogical world of biology to the digital world of the computer.[1]

In their turn, computer scientists have become increasingly interested in biology. One of the highly promising branches of computer science which has developed since the 1950s was the research into artificial intelligence and artificial life. Although the expectations were high – it was predicted that within some decades computers and robots would exist whose intelligence would exceed by far that of man – success remained limited to some specific areas, in spite of the spectacular development of information technologies in the past decades. It is true that, more than fifty years later, we have computers which can defeat the chess world champion, but in many areas toddlers and beetles still perform better than the most advanced computers. Top down programming of artificial intelligence and artificial life turned out to be much less simple than expected. This not only resulted in the fact that computer scientists started to study in depth the fundamental biological question what life basically is, but it also inspired them to use a bottom up approach, which consists of having computers and robots develop ‘themselves’ in accordance with biological principles.

Jos de Mul, Understanding nature. Dilthey, Plessner and biohermeneutics. In:G. D’Anna, H. Johach, E. S. Nelson, Dilthey, Anthropologie, und Geschichte. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2013, 459-478. 

Wilhelm Dilthey, der Begründer der Philosophie der Geisteswissenschaften, starb am 1. Oktober 1911 in Seis am Schlern (Südtirol). Zum Gedenken an seinen 100. Todestag trafen sich Hauptvertreter der internationalen Dilthey-Forschung zu einem Symposion „Anthropologie und Geschichte“ in Meran vom 26. September bis zum 1. Oktober 2011. Mit der Titelgebung verband sich die Idee zu überprüfen, wie weit Diltheys Denken für heutige anthropologische Fragestellungen und die aus der gesellschaftlichen Globalisierung resultierenden Probleme von Diversität und Universalität fruchtbar zu machen ist. 
Die Herausgeber Giuseppe D´Anna ist Professor für Philosophie an der Università degli Studi di Foggia/Italien. Helmut Johach, Dr. phil., ist Mitherausgeber von Diltheys Gesammelten Schriften, Bd. XVIII und XIX. Eric S. Nelson ist Associate Professor am Departement of Philosophy der University of Massachusetts in Lowell/USA.

In Dilthey’s Lebensphilosopie, anthropology and history are closely connected. As Dilthey himself states in an often quoted remark: »Was der Mensch sei, sagt nur die Geschichte«.^[1] However, for Dilthey history exclusively means cultural history. In order to develop a proper understanding of the historical condition of man, we should take natural history into account as well. After all, as a psycho-physical unity, Homo sapiens sapiens is the historical product of a complex interplay between both natural and cultural developments. Moreover, in the age of the life sciences, natural and cultural history seem to breach into one each other with an ever increasing tendency. Biotechnologies such as genetic modification, pathway engineering and genome transplantation transform organisms into cultural artifacts; and in the attempts to create artificial life (arguably the holy grail of synthetic biology), cultural artifacts increasingly display qualities that used to be restricted to organic life.

In the following, I will argue that Dilthey’s hermeneutics, especially his analysis of the triad Erlebnis, Ausdruck, and Verstehen, still offers a fruitful starting point for the development of a biohermeneutics that not only deals with human understanding and interpretation of human beings, (inter)actions and artefacts, but which also includes the understanding and interpretation of and by non-human agents. However, the fact that Dilthey, in his later hermeneutical writings often makes a rather dogmatic distinction between nature and culture, at first sight seems to be a serious obstacle for the development of a Dilthey-inspired biohermeneutics. For example, Dilthey explicitly denies the possibility of a human understanding of plant life: »Bedeutung oder Wert kann etwas nicht haben, von dem es kein Verstehen gibt. Ein Baum kann niemals Bedeutung haben« (GS VII, 259). The possibility of understanding or interpretation by non-human agents is not even considered by Dilthey. Despite that, I will argue that Dilthey’s later hermeneutic writings do contain some clues for the development of a biohermeneutics. I will further develop these clues with the help of the biophilosophy of Plessner and with reference to some recent developments in systems biology and neuropsychology.^[2]

Jos de Mul, Ma, mateloosheid, metafoor, methode, monomanie. In R. de Brabander, P. Molendijk, T. Rahimy, S. van Tuinen (red.). Voorstellen tot werkelijkheid. Het denken en doen van Henk Oosterling. Rotterdam: Trichis, 2012.

Als in een spiritualitijd van hier en nu de schijn heilig wordt verklaard, dan in ieder geval inzoverre afstand wordt genomen van een schijnheiligheid die het Andere slechts tolereert, omdat dit niets bedreigt. En als dit leven in de heiligheid van de schijn een affirmatie is van de kunst-matige kwaliteit van een bestaan aan de grenzen van de waarheid, dus daar waar de waarde van de waarheden wordt beproefd, dan opent die niet-plaats zich als een afgrond die het nu en later, het hier en dat wat zich aan gene zijde ervan uitstrekt met elkaar verbindt. Het is in deze nimmer af te sluiten ruimte, dat de val van de metafysica plaats vindt en de tuimeling, die leven heet, een weg moet vinden.
(Oosterling, Door schijn bewogen, 650)

Collaboratie of zelfdestructie is geen keuze. Ze komen samen in wat ik een hypokritiek noem: een kritiek die zichzelf ondermijnt in het besef dat ze even noodzakelijk als onmogelijk is. (Oosterling, Radicale middelmatigheid, 13)

Beroerde inleiding

Jos de Mul. PedoBot^® is niet boos, maar wel verdrietig (en soms opgewonden). Over intelligente robots, emoties en sociale interactie. In: J.B. de Jong (red.), Kenniskamer Intelligente Robots, 56-63. Den Haag: Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie en Rathenau Instituut, 2011.

Look David, I can see you’re really upset about this. I honestly think you ought to sit down calmly, take a stress pill, and think things over.

HAL

Tot voor kort troffen we robots, behalve in sciencefiction romans en films, vooral aan in de fabriek. De industriële robot is daaruit inmiddels niet meer weg te denken. Schoorvoetend maakt de robot nu echter ook zijn entree in de publieke en private ruimte, waardoor hij als actor gaat deelnemen aan het menselijk verkeer. Daarvoor zijn allerlei nuttige toepassingen te bedenken, maar er zijn ook uiteenlopende gevaren en maatschappelijke en ethische vraagstukken mee verbonden. Indien we de robot op een succesvolle wijze met mensen laten interacteren, dan zullen ze niet alleen intelligent moeten zijn, maar ook goed met emoties om moeten kunnen gaan.

Jos de Mul. Redesigning Design. In Bas van Abel, Lucas Evers, Roel Klaassen, and Peter Troxler. Open Design Now. Why Design Cannot Remain Exclusive. Amsterdam: Bis Publishers, 2011, 34-39.

The title of my talk today is “Redesigning (open) design” and the subtitle reads “Applying database ontology”. Let me start explaining this title, the question I want to address this afternoon and the answer I’m going to defend. One of the themes of Picnic 2010 is Redesigning design, of which (Un)limited Words and the (Un)limited Design Awards Ceremony are also part. In the program of Picnic 2010 the theme Redesigning Design is introduced as follows: “The design industry is going through fundamental changes. Open design, downloadable design and distributed design democratize the design industry, and imply that anyone can be a designer or a producer”. The subtext of this message seems to be that open design - for reasons of brevity I will use this term as an umbrella for the aforementioned developments, thus including downloadable design and distributed design – is something intrinsically good, so that we should promote it. Though my general attitude towards open design is a positive one, I think we should keep an open eye for the obstacles and pitfalls, in order to avoid that we will throw out the (designed) baby along with the bath water.

My talk consists of three parts. First I will present a short sketch of open design. I realize that most of you will be familiar with open design, probably even more familiar than I am, but as this concept has quite some different connotations and for that reason is prone to conceptual confusion, it might be useful to illuminate this tag cloud of connotations. In this first part, I will also summarize the main objections that can be (and has been) directed against open design.

Just like the other members of the ‘open movement’, such as open source software, open science, and open technology (as we will see, especially the open biology movement is an interesting example within this context), open design is strongly connected with the development of the computer and the internet. For that reason, in order to gain a deeper insight in both the chances and the pitfalls of open design, we should study the fundamental characteristics of the digital domain. In the second part of my talk I will give a sketch of the database ontology, the ABCD of computing, that underlies the digital domain. And finally, in the third part of my talk I will investigate some of the implications of this database ontology for the world of design. I will argue that in order to develop the positive aspects of open design without falling into the pitfalls, the designer should not so much give up his activities as a designer, but rather should redesign these activities. The designer of the future has to become a database designer, a meta-designer, who does not design objects, but rather a design space in which unskilled users are able to design their objects in a user-friendly way.

Bibi van den Berg and Jos de Mul. Remote control. Human autonomy in the age of computer-mediated agency. In: Mireille Hildebrandt and Antoinette Rouvroy (eds.) Autonomic Computing and Transformations of Human Agency. Philosophers of Law meeting Philosophers of Technology. London: Routledge, 2011, 46-63.

Jos de Mul and Bibi van den Berg contend that to a considerable extent, human action has always been ‘remote controlled’ by internal and external factors which are beyond individuals’ control. They argue that it is the reflection on such remote control a posteriori that allows for a ‘reflexive appropriation’ of these factors as our own motivators. The question they thus raise is what difference autonomic computing makes at this point and under what circumstances it will either strengthen or hinder human agency, defined in terms of ‘reflexive appropriation’. 

Jos de Mul. Dataïsme. Het kunstwerk in het tijdperk van zijn digitale recombineerbaarheid. In J. Swinnen (red.), Anders zichtbaar. Brussel: VUB Press 2010, 264-276.

1. Inleiding

Kunstenaars, van de prehistorische grotschilder tot aan de samplende computerkunstenaar, hebben altijd gebruik gemaakt van media. Media – het woord hier gebruikt in de brede betekenis van ‘middelen om informatie over te dragen’[1]  - zijn nooit neutraal. Ten minste vanaf Kants Copernicaanse omwenteling weten we dat menselijke ervaring mede geconstitueerd en gestructureerd wordt door de specifieke aard van onze zintuigen en ons verstand. En sinds de zogenaamde linguïstische en mediatische wending beseffen we bovendien dat ook de media waarvan onze zintuigen en verstand gebruik maken een belangrijke configurerende rol spelen in de ervaring van de buitenwereld, onze medemensen en onszelf (Münker, Roesler, & Sandbothe, 2003; De Mul, 2008a). De esthetische ervaring vormt hierop geen uitzondering.  Artistieke media zijn interfaces die niet alleen de verbeelding van de kunstenaar mede vormgeeft, maar die ook het kunstwerk en de esthetische receptie op fundamentele wijze raakt.

In deze bijdrage zal ik nader ingaan op de manier waarop de computer, en meer in het bijzonder de culturele vorm van de database de hedendaagse esthetische ervaring constitueert en structureert. Mijn uitgangspunt is Walter Benjamins beroemde essay ‘Het kunstwerk in het tijdperk van zijn mechanische reproduceerbaarheid’, dat in 1936 voor het eerst werd gepubliceerd (in het Frans) in het Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. In dit epochale essay onderzoekt Benjamin onder meer hoe de mechanische reproductie het kunstwerk transformeert. Zijn stelling is dat in deze ontologische transformatie de cultwaarde van het kunstwerk wordt vervangen door een tentoonstellingswaarde. De these die ik in het volgende zal verdedigen is, ten eerste,  dat in het tijdperk van de digitale recombineerbaarheid de database het ontologische model vormt voor het kunstwerk, en, ten tweede, dat in deze transformatie de tentoonstellingswaarde wordt vervangen door wat we manipulatiewaarde zouden kunnen noemen.

Jos de Mul. The work of art in the age of digital recombination. In J. Raessens, M. Schäfer, M. v. d. Boomen, Lehmann and S. A.-S. & Lammes (eds.), Digital Material: Anchoring New Media in Daily Life and Technology. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, May 2009, 95-106.

Artists, from the prehistoric painters who engraved and painted figures on cave walls to new media artists whose work depends on computer technologies, have always used media. Media, used here in the broad sense as ‘means for presenting information’[1], are not innocent means. Ever since Kant’s Copernican revolution, we know that experience is constituted and structured by the forms of sensibility and the categories of human understanding, and after the so-called linguistic and mediatic turns in philosophy, it is generally assumed that media play a crucial role in the configuration of the human mind and experience. Media are interfaces that mediate not only between us and our world (designation), but also between us and our fellow man (communication), and between us and ourselves (self-understanding). Aesthetic experience is no exception: artistic media are interfaces that not only structure the imagination of the artist, but the work of art and the aesthetic reception as well.[2]

In this paper I aim to contribute to this reflection by analyzing the way the computer interface constitutes and structures aesthetic experience. My point of departure will be Walter Benjamin‘s ‘The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction‘,  first published in the Zeitschrift  für Sozialforschung  in 1936. In this epochal essay Benjamin investigates how mechanical reproduction  transforms the work of art, claiming that in this ontological transformation  the cult value, which once characterized the classical work of art, has been replaced by exhibition value. The thesis I will defend in this paper is, firstly, that in the age of digital recombination, the database constitutes the ontological model of the work of art and, secondly, that in this transformation the exhibition value is being replaced by what we might call manipulation value.

Jos de Mul. Wittgenstein 2.0: Philosophical reading and writing after the mediatic turn. In: A. Pichler & H. Hrachovec (eds.) Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Information. Proceedings of the 30th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 200 Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. New Series, Vol 6. Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 157-183.
 

Wittgenstein 2.0: Philosophical reading and writing after the mediatic turn
 

Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinne ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können.
Ludwig Wittgenstein

Glattes Eis, ein Paradies für den, der gut zu tanzen weiß.
Friedrich Nietzsche

Introduction¹

‘Although Wittgenstein is widely regarded as one of the most important and influential philosophers of this century, there is very little agreement about the nature of his contribution. In fact, one of the most striking characteristics of the secondary literature on Wittgenstein is the overwhelming lack of agreement about what he believed and why’. These are the opening words of David Stern’s article ‘The availability of Wittgenstein’s philosophy’ in The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (Stern 1996, 442). In his introduction to the same volume, Hans Sluga even proposes that our fascination with Wittgenstein might be ‘a function of our bewilderment over who he really is and what his works stand for’ (Sluga 1996, 1).